

7th Infantry Division (Light)



Introduction

Distinctive Unit Insignia for units of the 7th Infantry Division (Light)



7 Infantry Division



9th Infantry
Regiment



17th Infantry
Regiment



21st Infantry
Regiment



27th Infantry
Regiment



9th Cavalry
Regiment



15th Field Artillery
Regiment



8th Field Artillery
Regiment



123rd Aviation
Regiment



7th Aviation
Battalion



7th Medical
Battalion



7th S & T
Battalion



13th Engineer
Battalion



62nd Air Defense
Artillery Regiment



107th MI
Battalion



127th Signal
Battalion



707th
Maintenance
Battalion

INTRODUCTION TO THE ORIGIN OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)

Mission

When directed by the National Command Authority, rapidly deploy as a light infantry combined arms force to conduct military operations in support of national objectives

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Origin

- Army leaders in the early 1980s looked to a future that presented complex challenges spanning the spectrum of conflict. As an instrument of national strategy, the Army had to posture itself for rapid and flexible deployment and employment, and simultaneously contend with a shrinking force structure and budget.
- In 1984, Chief of Staff of the Army, General John A. Wickham, Jr., published a "white paper" that described a force ideally suited to the changing strategic environment. He called for the creation of light infantry divisions (LID) of about 10,000 soldiers each, which could deploy rapidly to trouble spots worldwide. "Soldier power," Instead of firepower, would be the wellspring of the division's strength. The first of the new LIDs was to be the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord.

**UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF**

16 April 1984

TO: The Soldiers and Civilians of the United States Army

This White Paper provides direction for the development of the finest light infantry divisions the US Army can field.

Army leadership is convinced, based on careful examination of studies which postulate the kind of world in which we will be living and the nature of conflict we can expect to face, that an important need exists for highly trained, rapidly deployable light forces. The British action in the Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and our recent success in Grenada confirm that credible forces do not always have to be heavy forces. Accordingly, we have committed ourselves to creating a new light infantry division structure beginning with the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord.

This 10,000(+) man force will have a greater tooth-to-tail ratio than any of our other Army divisions and will be deployable worldwide three times faster than existing infantry divisions. It will be an offensively oriented, highly responsive division organized for a wide range of missions worldwide, particularly where close fighting terrain exists.

"Soldier Power" will make the light infantry division uniquely effective. Soldier power is developed through thorough, rigorous training, physical and mental toughness, excellence in basic infantry skill, and competent, resourceful leadership. We must take advantage of innovative training techniques and integrate lightweight, high-technology equipment into the division to give our soldiers a crucial edge over their opponents; We must eliminate the training detractors which would keep us from building the world's finest infantry units, and we must provide a concerned command climate that cares for our soldiers and their family members.

The 7th Infantry Division conversion must be successful, since it will serve as the blueprint for other light divisions. We must factor in the lessons learned from the COHORT experience and ensure that we are developing cohesive, hard hitting units capable of bold, independent, decisive action.

It is important for all of us to recognize the geo-strategic' value as well as battlefield utility of the light infantry division concept. The concept has relevance because it involve development of not only highly deployable, hard hitting combat units with a higher ratio of combat to support capabilities but also lighter, technologically current equipment and resources. The smallest Active Army in 34 years requires an Army of Excellence which optimizes combat power.

If we seize this concept with conviction, innovativeness, and vision, the Army's landpower will increase and, as a result, lay a more significant role in future US national security.

**JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, United states Army
Chief of Staff**

CRITERIA

1. Employ as part of a corps or joint task force.
2. Receive external support when employed as an independent force in excess of 48 hours.
3. Maintain a high leader to led ratio.
4. Develop highly trained and skilled infantrymen capable of operating effectively at the small-unit level
5. Excel at combat operations in close and urbanized terrain
6. Excel at night fighting
7. Deploy in approximately 500 C141B sorties
8. Field high-technology systems to make the division lethal, yet light.

CRITERIA

9. Ensure commonality of equipment, supplies (particularly ammunition), and organizational structures
10. Train primarily for low- to mid-intensity conflict (LIC/MIC) against light forces
11. Maintain a high ratio of combat to noncombat soldiers
12. Reduce non-tactical overhead to a minimum
13. Retain as organic elements only the personnel and equipment which will always be needed
14. Identify dedicated external augmenting units to speed integration of the forces
15. Conduct training to produce soldiers and units capable of performing multiple missions
16. Accept risk to keep the divisional structure light

Concept of Rapid Deployment and Employment

- As the most strategically deployable division in the U.S. Army, the 7ID (L) must be able to rapidly deploy worldwide and conduct combat operations upon arrival
- It must begin the deployment airflow within 18 hours of notification from FORSCOM and sustain the flow to permit the Division to close in the operating area within six days.
- The task organization, airframe and airfield capabilities, and requirements for external support directly affect the Division's sortie count and closure time

DEPLOYMENT

- The Division is task organized into three brigade task forces for training and deployment.
- An infantry brigade of three infantry battalions is the core of each task force and is complemented with appropriate combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units (the brigade "Slice").
- These brigade task forces are called division ready brigades (DRB) and are numbered 1 through 3.
- The DRBs maintain various stages of readiness and deploy in DRB sequence
- DRB1 maintains the highest state of readiness; it must be able to meet the Division's 18-hour wheels-up requirement
- The DRB1 mission rotates among the Division's three infantry brigades.

DEPLOYMENT

- The Division's nine infantry battalions form the nucleus of the DRBs.
- They are designated division ready forces (DRF) and are numbered 1 through 9 for ease of control and identification. Like the DRBs, these battalions maintain various stages of readiness and deploy in DRF sequence
- DRF1 is task organized with other divisional combat, CS, and CSS units and U.S Air Force elements
- The remaining DRFs are task organized with Fire Support Elements (FSE) and Fire Support Teams (FIST) only
- Within DRF1 is the Initial Ready Company (IRC), which is the first unit of the Division to deploy

DEPLOYMENT

DRB ORGANIZATION		
DRB 1	DRB 2	DRB 3
DRF 1 (Includes IRC)	DRF 4	DRF 7
DRF 2	DRF 5	DRF 8
DRF 3	DRF 6	DRF 9

- The DRB1 may deploy in any configuration appropriate to its assigned mission
- The deploying force commander determines final task organization based on directives from higher headquarters and the factors of METT-T

DEPLOYMENT

- The Assault Command Post (ACP) is the lead Division command and control (C2) element deployed with the DRB1
- Its base configuration includes the Commanding General or the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), staff representatives from each battlefield operating system (BOS), tactical satellite, high frequency, and FM communications systems, and nine HMMWVs
- This CP can be loaded on 2 C141Bs. It is designed to provide C2 for Division forces throughout a deployment, or to conduct tactical operations until such time as the entire Division arrives in the theater of operations
- The ACP can be augmented with additional personnel based on METT-T. The remainder of the Division's command and control structure deploys after the DRB1 and links up with the ACP in the theater of operations

DEPLOYMENT

- Once this happens, the ACP dissolves and is replaced by the Division Main (DMAIN), Tactical (DTAC), and Rear (DREAR) command posts
- Combat, CS, and CSS elements
 - Not task organized with DRB1 begin deployment immediately following DRB1
 - These elements are organized into 33 "modules" designed to permit rapid tailoring of follow-on forces
- The 7ID (L)'s method of organizing ensures a flexible base from which to react to contingencies
- Based on the tactical situation, the Division can quickly task organize as necessary to begin deployment within 18 hours of notification


EMPLOYMENT

- Commenting on the difference between light and other types of forces, GEN Burba, the FORSCOM Commander”
 - has noted that the LID's "method of fighting is quite different from that employed by airborne, air assault, and dismounted infantry units whose more robust organizations give them greater utility in more intense combat environments in open terrain."
- The 7ID (L) is most effective when it performs the missions for which Army planners designed it:
 - contingency operations characterized by restrictive terrain, low-intensity conflict, and a minimal armor threat
- Some important employment consideration are :

EMPLOYMENT


- Forced Entry.
 - The 7ID (L) does not have a forced-entry capability
 - It depends on airborne units, special operations forces, Marines, or host-nation troops to seize ports and airfields necessary for mission accomplishment
- Establish the Lodgment
 - The IRC, DRF1, follow-on elements of the DRBI, and ACP will relieve the friendly forces at the arrival airfield and establish a lodgment
 - The lodgment provides a secure perimeter within which the Division may deploy follow-on forces, establish C2, conduct mission planning, and begin combat operations
 - If the lodgment and the arrival airfield are collocated, we can expect to share the lodgment with other U.S. and host-nation ground and air forces.

Phase 1



Quick Deployment
Rapid buildup into
Secure airfield
Establish the lodgment

Phase 2



Deployment forward
for Tactical Operations

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

- Light infantry soldiers work best in restrictive terrain and built-up areas against infantry, light infantry, insurgent type forces
- Their mobility and anti-armor capabilities are limited; consequently, their training emphasizes mission-type orders, small-unit operations at night, infiltration, and air assault
- Because of their vulnerability to indirect fire, light forces must remain offensively oriented; and focus on enemy forces (not terrain)

TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

- A typical mission for light forces is an infiltration attack conducted over two or more periods of darkness
- The first night might entail small-unit infiltration to multiple hide sites throughout the depth of the enemy positions
- During the second and subsequent nights, light forces would mass, direct artillery fire on the enemy, and secure objectives
- Aerial resupply by containerized delivery system (CDS) from C130 or C141B aircraft, or by helicopter, would be the preferred method of logistical support

AUGMENTATION

- Refers to those combat, CS, and CSS elements that may be added to the 7ID (L) task organization by a higher headquarters based on METT-T requirements
- CSS augmentation, with an emphasis on maintenance and transportation, is particularly important because of the austerity of the Division's CSS structure.

DRF-1 Typical

